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BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH THE UNIFORM CODE OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE:  THE NEED TO RECALIBRATE THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, DUE PROCESS, AND GOOD ORDER AND 
DISCIPLINE 
ANTHONY J. GHIOTTO* 
ABSTRACT 
The military justice system is unique.  At the center of this system is 
not a judge or even an attorney, but rather a military commander.  The 
commander has the authority to charge service members with offenses, 
refer these cases to courts-martial, select the panel member who will hear 
the case, and to then review the findings and sentences adjudged by the 
court-martial.  The primacy of the commander stems from the dual goals of 
the military justice system: to preserve good order and discipline, while also 
ensuring justice is achieved.  Recently, though, reformers have argued that 
commanders have failed the system.  Highlighting the recent increase in 
military sexual assaults and the rash of service member misconduct during 
deployment, these reformers argue that commanders should be removed 
from the military justice system.  This paper argues, however, that it is not 
the commanders that failed the military justice system, but rather the 
military justice system that failed the commanders. 
For commanders to ensure service members abide by their orders, they 
must be able to effectuate punishment that is credible and transparent.  
Simultaneously, this punishment must be viewed as legitimate.  A balanced 
military justice trinity weighing good order and discipline, due process, and 
the military justice system provides the commander with these tools.  The 
current system, though, does not present this balance.  The gradual increase 
of due process into the military justice system has rendered the court-
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martial an obsolete tool, and consequently commanders rarely utilize it.  
Thus, commanders lack the capability to deter service member misconduct.  
This paper argues that only by restoring the balance, specifically by scaling 
back the extra-constitutional due process rights afforded to accused service 
members, can commanders effectively combat the increase in service 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the wears of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States continues 
to possess the world’s preeminent military force.  And at the core of any 
successful military unit is good order and discipline.  Good order and 
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discipline is, as George Washington remarked, “the soul of an Army.”1  
During the recent decade of war, however, cracks emerged in the military’s 
foundation of good order and discipline, both in garrison and in the 
deployed environment.  Two events have come to symbolize these cracks:  
the killing of twenty-four innocent Iraqi civilians by service members in 
Haditha, Iraq, and the dramatic increase in service members sexually 
assaulted by other service members.2 
The intense nature of these events captured the public’s attention as to 
the apparent breakdown of good order and discipline within the military, 
and the military’s responses to these events have led to calls for dramatic 
reforms.  In Haditha, only one of the Marines involved was convicted in a 
court-martial, which resulted in the convening authority approving no 
confinement.3  Regarding sexual assault, two Air Force convening 
authorities set aside the sexual assault convictions of two officers, 
undermining the sexual assault reform efforts of senior military leaders.4  
 
1.  John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., 
1, 6 (Mar. 2000). 
2.  DEFENSE LEGAL POLICY BOARD, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 
IN COMBAT ZONES: MILITARY JUSTICE IN CASES OF U.S. SERVICE MEMBERS ALLEGED TO HAVE 
CAUSED THE DEATH, INJURY OR ABUSE OF NON-COMBATANTS IN IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN 154-82 
(2013).  On November 19, 2005, Marines reported a small arms fire attack from homes within 
Haditha, Iraq.  Id. at 155.  The battalion proceeded to clear several homes.  Id.  The Marine Corps 
battalion suffered an IED attack, resulting in the death of a popular battalion Marine and two other 
Marines wounded.  Id.  In the operation’s aftermath, an investigation revealed that twenty-four 
unarmed Iraqi non-combatants, including women, children, and elderly, were killed by the Marine 
battalion.  Id. at 156.  In November 2013, the Department of Defense released that it received 
3,553 complaints of sexual assault within the military for the first three quarters of fiscal year 
2013—a 50% increase from the total number reported for fiscal year 2012.  See Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Reports of Sexual Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, 
http://www nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-of-military-sexual-assault-rise-sharply html?_r=0.  
Similarly, a Department of Defense survey revealed that in 2011, 26,000 service members related 
in the survey that they were the victims of sexual assault, whereas only 19,000 answered as such 
in 2010.  Id. 
3.  REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 154-55, 164.  Marine Corps 
commanders preferred charges against six of the battalion members, including the battalion 
commander.  Id. at 154-55.  Prior to court-martial, however, charges were dropped against five of 
the members, including the battalion commander, who instead was forced into early retirement.  
Id.  Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich faced a general court-martial, where he was charged with three 
specifications of violating Article 92, Dereliction of Duty; nine specifications of violating Article 
119, Voluntary Manslaughter; two specifications of Article 128, Aggravated Assault; and one 
specification of Article 134, Obstruction of Justice.  Id. at 164.  In the midst of trial, Sergeant 
Wuterich and the convening authority reached a pretrial agreement where, in return of Sergeant 
Wuterich’s plea of guilty to one specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority 
would dismiss the remaining charges and their specifications.  Id.  Sergeant Wuterich was 
sentenced to confinement for ninety days, reduction in grade to E-1, and forfeiture of $984.06 pay 
per month for three months.  Id.  Pursuant to the pretrial agreement, the convening authority did 
not approve the confinement portion of the punishment.  Id. 
4.  See James Risen, Hagel to Open Review of Sexual Assault Case, N.Y TIMES, March 11, 
2013, http://mobile nytimes.com/2013/03/12/us/politics/hagel-to-open-review-of-sexual-assault-
case html.  In November 2012, a panel of military officers found Lt. Col. James Wilkerson guilty 
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Multiplied by several acts of sexual misconduct across the military 
departments, the military command’s failure to adequately address these 
events resulted in Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introducing legislation to 
dramatically alter the military justice system.5  Supported by several legal 
scholars and victim advocates, Senator Gillibrand proposed removing the 
commander’s authority to prosecute service members for any offense that 
could result in an excess of one year of confinement, with some exceptions 
for military specific offenses, and instead placing such authority in a judge 
advocate with a rank of O-6 or above.6 
Although Senator Gillibrand’s bill failed to receive the sixty Senate 
votes necessary to survive a filibuster, fifty-five senators voted in favor of 
 
of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.  Id.  The members sentenced Lt. Col. 
Wilkerson to one year of confinement and a dismissal from the Air Force.  Id.  The conviction 
stemmed from an allegation by a civilian female who reported that Lt. Col. Wilkerson sexually 
assaulted her when she was asleep at his home.  Id.  After his conviction, the general court-martial 
convening authority, Lt. Gen. Craig Franklin, set-aside the conviction pursuant to his authority 
under Article 60, UCMJ.  Id.  Reportedly, he subsequently attempted to promote Lt. Col. 
Wilkerson and provide him with a command.  Id.  In February 2012, Lt. Gen. Susan Helms set-
aside Capt. Matthew Herrera’s sexual assault conviction.  Craig Whitlock, General’s Promotion 
Blocked Over Her Dismissal of Sex-Assault Verdict, WASH. POST, May 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/generals-promotion-blocked-over-her-
dismissal-of-sex-assault-verdict/2013/05/06/ef853f8c-b64c-11e2-bd07-b6e0e6152528_story.html.  
Previously, a panel of officers convicted Capt. Herrera of sexually assaulting a female Air Force 
lieutenant and sentenced him to sixty days of confinement and a dismissal.  Id. 
5.  S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013).  Section (2)(a)(3) provides:  
[T]he disposition of charges pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be subject to the 
following: (A) The determination whether to try such charges by court-martial shall be 
made by a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces designated in accordance with 
regulations prescribed for purposes of this subsection from among commissioned 
officers of the Armed Forces in grade O-6 or higher who – (i) are available for detail 
as trial counsel under section 827 of title 10, United States Code (article 27 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.   
Id. at § 2(a)(3).   
Section 2(a)(1) further provides: 
This provision is “with respect to charges under Chapter 47 of title 10, United States 
Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), that allege an offense, other than an 
offense specified in paragraph (2), that is triable by court-martial that chapter for 
which the maximum punishment authorized under that chapter includes confinement 
for more than one year . . . .  
Id. at § 2(a)(1). 
The excluded offenses, per section 2, are:  
(A) An offense under sections 883 through 891 of title 10, United States Code (articles 
83 through 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).  (B) An offense under 
sections 893 through 917 of title 10, United States Code (articles 93 through 117 of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice).  (C) An offense under section 933 of title 10, 
United States Code (article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).  
Id. at § 2(a)(2).   
6.  See Richard L. Able et al., Law Professor’s Statement on Reform of Military Justice 
(2013), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/conference/LawProfessorsStatement.pdf. 
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the bill.7  Most strikingly, the bill received bipartisan support, with forty-
four Democrats and eleven Republicans voting for the bill.8  Beyond the 
Senate vote, sexual assault and the military’s supposed inability to address 
it now permeate American culture, serving as the subject of the Academy 
Award nominated documentary The Invisible War and as a major plotline 
on House of Cards, a popular television show.9  The military departments 
must heed the Senate vote and the continued public interest as an indication 
that reform to the military justice system is coming, and it may be dramatic. 
Acknowledging that reform is inevitable, the military departments must 
first answer the why question—why the increase in the severity and 
frequency of service member misconduct?  Only after answering that 
question can they move onto the how question—how do we fix it?  These 
are complicated questions, with each proposed answer having second and 
third order effects, but the military departments possess the strategic 
framework to tackle them. 
Military professionals tend to turn to Carl von Clausewitz when faced 
with perplexing strategic questions.10  In On War, Clausewitz views war as 
a “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and 
enmity.”11  Each of these prongs “are like three different codes of law, 
deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one 
another.”12  Indeed, “[a] theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix 
an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such 
an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”13  As such, 
Clausewitz burdens the strategist with developing “a theory that maintains a 
 
7.  Darren Samuelsohn, Juana Summers, & Anna Palmer, Kirsten Gillebrand’s Sexual 
Assault Bill Derailed, POLITICO (March 6, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/senate-
military-sexual-assault-vote-104372 html. 
8.  Id.  This vote proved especially bipartisan with the Republic Senate Majority Leader, 
Mitch McConnell, and leading Tea Party affiliated Senator, Ted Cruz, voting in favor of the bill, 
along with several prominent liberal Democrat senators, including Senator Gillibrand.  Id.  
9.  On season 2 of House of Cards, a Netflix streaming online show, the primary female 
antagonist, Claire Underwood, related that a Marine General previously sexually assaulted her, 
causing other victims to come forward.  HOUSE OF CARDS (Netflix 2014).  Consequently, 
emboldened by her husband’s position as the Vice President of the United States, she advocated 
for the passing of a bill that would take the disposition of sexual assault cases out of the military 
chain-of-command and increase civilian control of the military justice system.  Id.  This plot line 
lasted the entire season and proved to be essential to the show’s main plot.  
10.  See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1989).  Military doctrine is peppered with references to Clausewitz, 
especially joint and Army publications.  Similarly, Clausewitz forms the foundation for much of 
the military departments’ development education. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
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balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between 
three magnets.”14 
The Clausewitzian trinity can be applied to the rash of service member 
misconduct to not only understand why it has occurred, but also to guide 
reform efforts.  Instead of a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial 
violence, hatred, and enmity, however, service member misconduct consists 
of a paradoxical trinity composed of good order and discipline, the military 
justice system, and due process. 
Military justice, good order and discipline, and due process are all 
unique and operate independently of one another.  Simultaneously, they 
depend upon one another; the military justice system serves as the legal 
structure by which the military enforces good order and discipline.  And 
due process provides legitimacy and a sense of justice to both the military 
justice system and good order and discipline.  Problems arise when reform 
efforts fail to maintain the appropriate balance between these tendencies 
because strengthening one prong potentially weakens the other two. 
As the governmental branch ultimately responsible for the military 
justice system, Congress failed to maintain an appropriate balance between 
these three tendencies.  Following World War I, Congress incrementally 
increased the amount of due process afforded to accused service members.  
With the increased strength of the due process prong, the military justice 
system and good order and discipline suffered.  The military justice system, 
specifically the court-martial process, became an ineffective tool for 
commanders to effectuate good order and discipline.  In turn, good order 
and discipline waned, culminating in the recent breakdowns.  Therefore, the 
military departments should drive Congress to aim its reform efforts at 
developing the appropriate balance between good order and discipline, the 
military justice system, and due process. 
Section II analyzes the historical development of military justice.  It 
highlights the fact that military justice originally consisted of a military 
justice system conflated with good order and discipline: a system with few 
due process rights afforded to accused service members.  Gradually, 
though, Congress and the military departments increased the role of due 
process, resulting in the military justice trinity present today.  Section III 
assesses the impact that the increased role of due process has on the military 
justice system.  It argues that increases in due process have severely limited 
commanders’ use of the court-martial as a tool to preserve good order and 
discipline.  Section IV examines the relationship between the 
marginalization of the court-martial as a tool for good order and discipline.  
 
14.  Id. 
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It posits that without the court-martial commanders are limited in their 
ability to deter misconduct within their units.  Section V provides 
recommendations designed to balance the military justice trinity. 
II. THE FORMATION OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY: 
FROM A MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM DOMINATED BY GOOD 
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE TO ONE DOMINATED BY DUE 
PROCESS 
Depending on whom one speaks to, the United States’ system of 
military justice is either the gold standard15 or “is to justice as military 
music is to music.”16  The difference in opinion stems from the military 
justice trinity, which is composed of due process, good order and discipline, 
and the military justice system.  In different times, one prong may weigh 
more heavily than the others, and interested observers, including service 
members, policy makers, and scholars, assess the system based on which 
prong is most important at that time.  The military justice system is 
dynamic, and the relationship between each prong is ever-changing.  If one 
narrative stretches throughout the history of military justice, however, it is 
the increased role of due process.  At its inception, military justice was not 
a trinity, but consisted of a military justice system designed solely to 
effectuate good order and discipline.  The Articles of War, the founding 
legislation for military justice, constricted due process in favor of 
commanders being able to exercise quick and severe discipline.  As the 
services grew and more Americans encountered the military justice system, 
service members began to demand due process rights.  The Congress and 
the military responded with incremental due process rights that 
subsequently created the trinity and today’s system. 
A. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER THE ARTICLES OF WAR 
The Articles of War proved to be a lasting and flexible contribution to 
the development of the military justice system.  Arising during the 
Revolutionary War, the Articles of War guided military justice into the 
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II.   
During each of these wars, the Articles of War placed the primacy of the 
commander—often the battlefield commander—at the center of military 
justice.  Another constant, though, during the Articles of War period was 
 
15.  Kenneth M. Theurer and James W. Russell, III, Why Military Justice Matters, 37 THE 
REPORTER 10 (Summer 2010). 
16.  ROBERT SHERRIL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC 2 
(1970).  The quote derives from French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau.  Id. 
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the call for reform.  After each major conflict, veterans, who often saw the 
abuses of unbridled command discretion firsthand, returned with calls for 
reform.  It is from these calls for reform that due process entered into the 
military justice system. 
1. The Articles of War:  The Primacy of Good Order and 
Discipline 
The Constitution provides Congress with the authority “to raise and 
support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining” the militia.17  Under these provisions, 
the nation’s founders signaled that the authority for military justice resided 
not in the civilian Article III courts, but rather with Congress.18  Pursuant to 
this authority, Congress implemented the Navy and Army Articles of War, 
which provided the legal mechanism to ensure good order and discipline 
within the nascent American armies and navies.19 
By balancing an accused service member’s due process rights against 
the need for good order and discipline, these Articles captured General 
William Sherman’s oft quoted description of military justice: 
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a 
community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible, 
consistent with the safety of all.  The object of military law is to 
govern armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of 
exercising the largest measure of force at the will of the nation. 
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each requires its 
own separate system of laws, statute and common.  An army is a 
collection of armed men obliged to obey one man.  Every 
enactment, every change of rules which impairs the principle 
weakens the army, impairs its values, and defeats the very object 
of its existence.  All the traditions of civil lawyers are antagonistic 
 
17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  The Supreme Court has afforded great “deference to the 
determination of Congress made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces.”   Weiss 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994).  See also James B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, The 
American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185 (2002). 
18.  David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2013).  See also Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (quoting Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in 
which the courts have less competence.  The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
. . . control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments . . . .”); Victor 
Hansen, Changes in Modern Military Codes and the Role of the Military Commander: What 
Should the United States Learn from this Revolution?, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 419, 427 
(2008).  
19.  See WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES 5-13 (1973). See also Hansen, 
supra note 18, at 427. 
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to this vital principle, and military men must meet them on the 
threshold of discussion, else armies will become demoralized by 
even grafting on our code their deductions from civil practice.20 
Legal scholars in the post-Civil War era formalized Sherman’s view of 
military justice solely as a means to ensure strict discipline.  William 
Winthrop, an Army Judge Advocate, published the leading treatise on 
military justice at the end of the 19th Century.21  In his treatise, Winthrop 
provided: “It follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive 
department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive 
power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to 
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing 
discipline therein.”22 
As such, the Articles of War conflated good order and discipline with 
the military justice system, finding little role for due process rights.  A 
commander had the authority to charge service members without 
conducting an investigation or rendering an oath, and accused service 
members did not possess the right to an attorney.23  In fact, attorneys were 
marginalized from the process.  The Articles did not require a military 
judge or a defense attorney.24  Nor did they even require the prosecutor be 
an attorney.25  The commander selected the court officers who would 
decide the case, and the commander had the sole authority to review the 
case upon its completion.26  At that stage, the commander possessed the 
authority to set aside a conviction and to find a service member guilty if the 
court-martial found him not guilty.27  The commander was subject to little, 
if any, review of his determinations.28  With the absence of due process, 
commanders utilized courts-martial to rapidly mete out punishment and 
secure good order and discipline. 
2. World War I and the Calls for Reform 
At the onset of World War I, service member misconduct remained 
governed by nearly the same Articles of War present since the Revolution.  
The events of the war led some to question whether the military justice 
 
20.  Schlueter, supra note 18, at 21 (quoting Letter to General W. S. Hancock, President of 
Military Serv. Inst., from W.T. Sherman (Dec. 9, 1879)). 
21.  GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 7. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. at 8. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
          
2014] BACK TO THE FUTURE 497 
system required modernization—specifically increased due process rights 
for accused service members.  Brigadier General Samuel Ansell led the 
calls for reform.  Ansell served as the Army’s acting Judge Advocate 
General (“JAG”), after the Army’s JAG, Major General Enoch Crowder, 
left to serve temporarily as the Provost Marshall General.29  Upon assuming 
his position, Ansell “suffered from a number of frustrations.”30  Primarily, 
he was “repeatedly shocked by the sentences handed down by Army courts-
martial, and his utter powerlessness to do anything to correct them.”31  A 
case involving thirteen African American soldiers who were tried, 
sentenced to death, and executed for mutiny before any higher authority 
was even notified of the trial especially concerned Ansell.32 
Ansell’s experiences during World War I led him to advocate for a 
dramatic overhaul of the military justice system.  He advocated for a 
“radically new concept of military law, one which would divorce the court-
martial from the commanding officer and move into the vacuum thus 
created lawyers, civilianlike rules of procedure and evidence, and a 
complex system of appellate review to filter out whatever remnants of past 
attitudes still remained.”33  To Ansell, the Articles of War, with their lack of 
due process, “was designed for the Government of the professional military 
serf of another age.”34  Spurred by Ansell’s advocacy, Congress introduced 
sweeping legislation that would (1) require commanders to make charges 
under oath and thoroughly investigate the charges before being brought to 
trial, (2) establish a “court judge advocate” who would perform the duties 
of trial judge, (3) provide that court members would be selected by the staff 
judge advocate from a panel of officers supplied to him by the convening 
authority, (4) require a sufficient number of enlisted court members when 
the accused was enlisted, (5) abolish the reviewing power of the 
commanding officer except for clemency authority, and (6) establish a court 
of military appeals where judges would have life tenure and cases involving 
certain severe punishments would warrant automatic review.35 
Congress declined to pass Ansell’s dramatic reforms.  However, 
Congress did provide additional due process protections to accused service 
members in the 1920 Articles of War.36  The new Articles “greatly changed 
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pretrial procedure by requiring sworn charges, a ‘thorough and impartial’ 
investigation, and expert legal advice for the commanding officer before he 
convened a court.”37  Furthermore, the 1920 Articles created a “law 
member” who served as a voting member of the court and was assigned 
some duties of a traditional trial judge, mainly the authority to rule on the 
admissibility of evidence and to instruct the court on its responsibilities and 
on the applicable law.38  Also, the new Articles required defense attorneys 
for all “but the lowest form of court-martial.”39  Additionally, the 1920 
revisions prevented commanders from imposing findings of guilty when 
accused service members were acquitted in trial.40 
Despite the increased due process, the 1920 Articles of War continued 
to emphasize the interconnectedness of the military justice system and good 
order and discipline at the cost of due process.  The Articles afforded a “law 
member,” but did not require that this individual actually be an attorney.41  
These provisions also limited the law member’s power by allowing the 
other court members to out-vote any ruling or determination made by the 
law member.42  Most dramatically, the first page of the revised Articles of 
War provided that military law is due process of law to those in the military 
service of the United States.43  To support this statement, the Articles cite to 
two Supreme Court cases: Reaves v. Ainsworth and U.S. ex rel. French v. 
Weeks.44  In both these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he 
courts are not the only instrumentalities of government.  They cannot 
command or regulate the army.”45  Consequently, under these cases, due 
process rights for accused service members arise not out of the Constitution 
or the courts but from Congress’s power to regulate the military. 
3. World War II and the Increased Call for Due Process 
Wars tend to serve as watershed moments for military justice, whereas 
interest in military justice wanes in peacetime.  Although the trinity 
remained largely untouched after World War I, World War II proved to be a 
 
37.  Id. at 10. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Articles of War: Hearing on S. 64 Before the S. Comm. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong. 
36 (1920). 
44.  U.S. ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 
(1911). 
45.  Reaves, 219 U.S. at 306; see also U.S. ex rel. French, 259 U.S. at 335 (finding that civil 
courts could not overturn decisions of military tribunals acting under Congress’s power). 
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dramatic turning point in military justice.  During the course of the war, 
approximately 80,000 service members were convicted by general court-
martial, “an average of nearly sixty convictions by the highest form of 
military court . . . every day of the war.”46  Overall, courts-martial of all 
types returned approximately two million convictions during the war.47  
These dramatic numbers, coupled with the overwhelming force used to 
fight the war, brought many Americans face-to-face with the military 
justice system.  When faced with the reality of a military justice system 
with limited due process, returning service members called for reform. 
These calls for reform led the department secretaries to establish 
several committees to examine military justice during World War II.48  The 
majority of these studies reflected flaws in the military system, mostly 
focusing on the lack of due process.  For example, the Vanderbilt 
Committee found fault with seven major areas: (1) a lack of attention to, 
emphasis on, and planning regarding military justice matters as a whole; (2) 
not enough qualified service members to serve as court officers and 
officials; (3) commanding officers frequently dominated the courts; (4) 
inadequate defense counsel; (5) sentences were frequently 
disproportionately severe; (6) discrimination between officers and enlisted 
members, both in the preferral of charges and in handing down convictions 
and sentences; and (7) inefficient and inadequate pretrial investigations.49  
Another study lamented that in its review of 2,115 cases, nearly half of 
them contained “flagrant miscarriages of justice.”50  A civilian judge at this 
time described a 1948 court-martial as “saturated with tyranny.”51 
A consensus arose from these committees: the military justice system 
and good order and discipline could not be conflated with one another.  The 
committees began to view military justice as a balance between the military 
justice system and good order and discipline.  Professor Edmund Morgan, 
the head of the Vanderbilt Committee, stated before Congress: “we are 
convinced that a Code of Military Justice cannot ignore the military 
circumstances under which it must operate but we are equally determined 
that it must be designated to administer justice.”52  Similarly, the Vanderbilt 
Committee report concluded: 
 
46.  GENEROUS, supra note 19, at 14. 
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48.  Id. at 15-17. 
49.  Id. at 16. 
50.  Id. at 18. 
51.  ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN, DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE 
COLD WAR COURT-MARTIAL 14 (2005).  
52.  Schlueter, supra note 18, at 29-30 (quoting INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 606 (2000 Reprint, Hein)).   
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A high military commander pressed by the awful responsibilities 
of his position and the need for speedy action has no sympathy 
with legal obstructions and delays, and is prone to regard the 
courts-martial primarily as instruments for enforcing discipline by 
instilling fear and inflicting punishment, and he does not always 
perceive that the more closely he can adhere to civilian standards 
of justice, the more likely he will be to maintain the respect and 
the morale of the troops recently drawn from the body of the 
people. 
Some of the critics of the Army system err on the other side and 
demand the meticulous preservation of the safeguards of the civil 
courts in the administration of justice in the courts of the Army.  
We reject this view for we think there is a middle ground between 
the viewpoint of the lawyer and the viewpoint of the general.53 
Thus, at the end of World War II, justice was no longer viewed merely 
as an impediment to good order and discipline.  Instead, critics of the 
system began to assert that justice could enhance good order and discipline 
by providing a sense of legitimacy and fairness to the commander’s efforts 
to preserve good order and discipline.  The focus then turned to how the 
military justice system could achieve that balance by providing a sense of 
justice and fairness to the process while also enabling the commander to 
preserve good order and discipline.  Reformers found the answer in due 
process and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). 
B. REFORM IS HERE:  THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND 
THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 
After World War II, reformers demanded revision of the military 
justice system.  They called specifically for the addition of the due process 
rights afforded to accused individuals in the civilian world.  The issue soon 
became what the scope of these reform efforts would be and who would 
lead the charge: Congress or the Executive branch.  Reformers achieved 
compromise and balance through two acts of legislation: the UCMJ and the 
Manual for Courts-Martial. 
1.  The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Congress enacted the UCMJ in an attempt to strike the appropriate 
balance between good order and discipline and the military justice system.  
 
53.  Id. at 29-30 (quoting REPORT OF WAR DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
MILITARY JUSTICE 5 (1946), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/report-war-
dept-advisory-committee.pdf). 
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Its primary method of doing so was by increasing the due process rights 
afforded to accused service members.  The Congressional debate over the 
UCMJ focused on the role of commanders.54  Advocates of reform argued 
in favor of placing increased restrictions on the commander and thereby 
increasing the role played by attorneys.55  In contrast, opponents of reform 
insisted that “[y]ou cannot maintain discipline by administering justice” and 
warned about the costs of increasing the role of attorneys.56  Ultimately, the 
UCMJ passed into law reflected a compromise between these views.  
Commanders would prefer charges, direct the pretrial investigation, refer 
charges to trial, and appoint counsel, law officers, and court members.57  
Commanders would also serve as the first “reviewer” of the results of 
trial.58  Notably, the UCMJ failed to require attorneys to serve as military 
judges.59  Nonetheless, the UCMJ provided for a lawyer at the pretrial 
investigation, prosecutorial and defense lawyers at the trial and appellate 
level, and an all-civilian Court of Military appeals.60  Overall, the UCMJ 
established “a procedural and substantive criminal law that applied across 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard” with an 
increased emphasis on due process rights.61 
2.  The Manual for Courts-Martial 
Once President Truman signed the UCMJ into law in 1950, military 
attorneys began to advocate for a Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”).62  
To many, the UCMJ amounted to a “skeleton whose framework will be 
filled in by a law manual.”63  The drafters of the UCMJ anticipated this 
need for a manual in drafting the UCMJ and created Article 36, which 
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provided the President with the authority to “prescribe rules . . . [of] 
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial.”64  To 
guide the President, the UCMJ provided that he “shall, so far as he deems 
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally 
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courts.”65  The only congressional oversight the provision required was the 
requirement that the President report the rules to Congress annually.66  By 
establishing the authority to create the MCM and delegating it to the 
President, Congress provided an additional means to bestow due process 
rights upon accused service members.  Similarly, the MCM provided a 
means to increase the “civilianization” of the military justice system by 
allowing the President to apply principles of law recognized in the federal 
system. 
C.  MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UCMJ AND MCM 
The UCMJ attempted to balance due process and good order and 
discipline by preserving the role of commander while also increasing due 
process protections.  Furthermore, the MCM attempted to establish a role 
for the Executive branch in the military justice while also ensuring a 
continued role for Congress.  These balances, though, left a fair amount of 
ambiguity, which in turn allowed other entities, such as the military courts 
and Congress, to continue to increase the amount of due process afforded in 
the military justice system. 
1. The Increased Role of the Court of Military Appeals 
While military justice was deployed in Korea, the military appellate 
courts increased due process in the military justice system.  Traditionally, 
the military departments viewed due process as arising from Congress, not 
the courts.  The Court of Military Appeals (“CoMA”), though, found 
differently.  In a 1951 case, the court found that “Congress intended, in so 
far as reasonably possible, to place military justice on the same plane as 
civilian justice, and to free those accused by the military from certain vices 
which infested the old system.”67  Based on this ruling, the court 
determined that it was within the province of the CoMA to determine what 
due process an accused service member was entitled to under the UCMJ 
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and MCM.  Specifically, the court “described the procedural protections 
required at court-martial, including the right to be informed of the charges, 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by counsel, to 
avoid self-incrimination, and to appeal a conviction.”68 
This ruling recognized that due process rights for service members 
arise from the UCMJ and MCM instead of the Constitution, and it is 
significant because the court in effect warned “the services that if those 
rights granted GI’s by Congress which parallel the Constitutional rights 
enjoyed by civilians were violated by proper procedure at courts-martial, 
CoMA would not consider such infringements harmless and would reverse 
the convictions that followed.”69  Thus, service members now had an 
avenue to not only define their due process rights, but to protect them as 
well. 
2. Reform During Vietnam 
The military justice system faced unique circumstances in Vietnam.  In 
Vietnam, commanders faced a near breakdown in good order and 
discipline; service members openly disobeyed orders, deserted, and 
committed acts of misconduct, such as fragging, drug abuse, rape, and 
murder.70  Commanders sought tools to effectively address this misconduct, 
even at the cost of accused service members’ due process rights.71  In the 
United States, though, the vocal opposition to the war led critics to argue 
that the problem in Vietnam was not due process but rather not enough due 
process.72  Hence, critics argued for further civilianization of the military 
justice system with an increased role for attorneys and less authority for 
commanders.73 
The call for further reform resulted in the 1968 Military Justice Act.  
The Act required that service members receive defense counsel for all 
special courts-martial where a bad conduct discharge was possible and for 
all other special courts-martial, unless deemed impractical because of 
military service.74  Additionally, the Act created an independent trial 
judiciary where active duty attorneys would serve as military judges.  The 
attorneys would have the authority to rule on pretrial motions as well as 
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issues of law and would serve under a separate chain of command from the 
convening authority.75  Additionally, the accused service member now had 
the right to request trial by military judge alone and to refuse a trial by 
summary court-martial.76 
D. THE CURRENT MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY:  THE BALANCE OF THE 
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, DUE PROCESS, AND GOOD ORDER 
AND DISCIPLINE 
Upon passage of the 1968 Military Justice Act, today’s military justice 
trinity was formed.  Under the new Act, commanders, carrying the 
responsibility to preserve good order and discipline within their units, 
remained at the center of the military justice system.  Simultaneously, 
though, due process rights permeated the system, increased the role of 
attorneys, and altered how commanders utilize military justice.  Before 
assessing the effectiveness of this trinity, however, a basic framework of the 
current military justice system and the role played by due process is 
necessary. 
1. The Current Military Justice System 
The role of the commander continues to define the current military 
justice system.  Because of this continued role, military law still struggles 
with its inherent purpose.  Is it to secure good order and discipline?  Or, is it 
to promote justice?  The current system attempts to answer both 
affirmatively. 
a. The Purpose of Military Law 
The current military justice system attempts to balance the need for 
good order and discipline with due process and the interests of the military 
justice.  Specifically, the 2012 MCM provides the nature and purpose of 
military law: 
Military law consists of the statutes governing the military 
establishment and regulations issued thereunder, the constitutional 
powers of the President and regulations issued thereunder, and the 
inherent authority of military commanders.  Military law includes 
jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction 
exercised by commanders with respect to nonjudicial punishment.  
The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in 
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maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to 
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, 
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United 
States.77 
Under this stated purpose, the current military justice trinity considers 
the role of justice and good order and discipline as being equal, 
noncompeting purposes that, when taken together, positively impact 
national security.  Inherent in this framework is the continued role of 
military commanders. 
b. Commander Driven System 
Perhaps the most unique aspect of the military justice system is the 
primacy of commanders.  The military justice system is predicated upon the 
“commander’s authority and discretion to control discipline within his or 
her unit.”78  To ensure this authority, the military justice system involves 
commanders at every part of the process, such as directing preliminary 
investigations into misconduct, evaluating the results of investigations, 
disposing of cases, preferral and referral of charges, selecting panel 
members, and taking final action on both the court-martial’s adjudged 
findings and sentence after the court-martial concludes.79 
The commander’s most significant role in the military justice process is 
that of convening authority.  Courts-martial are not standing courts; instead, 
they are convened when the need arises.  Department secretaries establish 
their department’s convening authorities, whom are seasoned and 
established military officers who have extensive command authority.80 
Generally, convening authorities involve themselves in cases only after 
the preferral of charges.81  Upon receiving the evidence and charges, the 
convening authority may dismiss the charges, refer the charges to a court-
martial, return the charges to the immediate commander for a lesser 
disposition, forward the charges with his or her recommendations to a 
higher convening authority, or direct further investigation to take place.82  
Should the convening authority refer the case to trial, he or she then selects 
the court members, who serve a role equivalent to that of a civilian jury.83  
 
77.  JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL I-
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81.  See RULES FOR COURT-MARTIAL 308(9) (2012) (hereinafter R.C.M.), 401(a). 
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Prior to trial, the convening authority is responsible for responding to any 
pretrial agreement offered by the accused service member, granting 
immunity for military witnesses, paying for any expert witnesses or 
consultants, and funding witness travel.84 
After the court-martial, the case returns to the convening authority for 
final action.85  The convening authority may grant clemency by suspending 
or disapproving a portion of the accused service member’s sentence, but he 
or she may not increase the sentence.86  Historically, the commander also 
had the ability to set aside a finding of guilty.87  In the wake of recent cases, 
however, Congress restricted that right, and now convening authorities are 
prohibited from setting aside any felony offense where the adjudged 
sentence is longer than six months or carries a discharge.88  Congress also 
prohibited convening authorities from setting aside convictions for any 
sexual offense, regardless of the adjudged sentence.89  Convening 
authorities remain unable to impose a finding of guilty when the court-
martial returns a finding of not guilty.90 
2. Due Process 
Although not explicitly stated in the MCM’s purpose and nature of 
military law, due process91 is a key component to the current military 
justice trinity.  Due process is the means by which justice impacts the 
military justice system and good order and discipline.  The current military 
justice system affords accused service members due process rights 
throughout the court-martial process.  These rights fall into several different 
categories: application of constitutional protections during pretrial 
processing of cases, military discovery practices, appointment and role of 
counsel, Article 32 hearings, use of military judges, trial procedures, and 
the appellate review of court-martial convictions.92 
 
84.  See R.C.M. 703(d), 704(c), 705(d).  
85.  See R.C.M. 1107(a). 
86.  See R.C.M. 1108(b), 1109(9). 
87.  See 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(3)(a) (1996); see also R.C.M. 1107(d)(1) (“The convening 
authority may for any or no reason disapprove a legal sentence in whole or in part, mitigate the 
sentence, and change a punishment to one of a different nature as long as the severity of the 
punishment is not increased.  The convening or higher authority may not increase the punishment 
imposed by a court-martial.”). 
88.  National Defense Authorization Act § 860(c)(4)(A), 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(4)(A) (2014). 
89.  Id. 
90.  10 U.S.C. § 860(f)(2)(A) (2014). 
91.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
92.  See Schleuter, supra note 18, at 63-71. 
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a. Application of the Bill of Rights Protections During 
Pretrial Processing 
The UCMJ affords service members constitutional due process rights 
during the pretrial investigation and processing of charges.93  Specifically, 
the Fourth Amendment applies in military proceedings to any search and 
seizure conducted pursuant to the investigation, whether conducted by 
military or civilian authorities.94  Similarly, the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination applies to any interrogations of an accused 
service member or to any request to produce incriminating information.95  
Furthermore, an accused service member’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches immediately upon questioning.96 
b. Military Discovery Practices 
Military discovery rules arise from accused service members’ due 
process rights.97  The UCMJ provides for a liberal discovery approach 
specifically designed to be broader than in civilian federal criminal 
proceedings “in an effort to eliminate pretrial gamesmanship.”98  The 
discovery rights afforded to accused service members include the right to 
compel the appearance of both military and civilian witnesses; the ability to 
request, from the government, an expert consultant or witness to assist the 
defense before trial and potentially testify during trial; and to have the 
prosecution automatically disclose names and contact information of 
prosecution witnesses, evidence that is favorable to the accused, evidence of 
any prior convictions, evidence of statements made by the accused, 
evidence seized from the accused, and evidence of any eyewitness 
identifications.99  Often, the government pays for these services, especially 
the witness travel expenses and expert consultant or witness fees.100 
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98.  Elizabeth C. Hernandez & Jason M. Ferguson, The Brady Bunch: An Examination of 
Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian Federal and Military Justice Systems, 67 A.F. L. REV. 187, 
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In addition to any exculpatory evidence, the military discovery rules 
subject impeachment evidence to discovery.101  Impeachment evidence 
“includes disclosure of evidence that may affect the credibility of a 
government witness.”102  This information need not be admissible at trial 
for it to be discoverable.103  Beyond the items required for discovery, the 
military discovery rules require government counsel to actively seek out 
potentially discoverable items and to do so in a timely manner.104  
Prosecutors must exercise due diligence to discover information that is 
material to the preparation of the defense, regardless of whether the defense 
could have discovered the information on its own.105 
c. Appointment and Role of Counsel 
The UCMJ106 affords accused service members their Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.107  An accused service member is provided with a military 
defense counsel free of cost.108  This attorney will represent the accused 
service member immediately and throughout the pretrial and court-martial 
process.109  Generally, the military defense counsel will be outside the 
installation commander’s chain-of-command; this ensures the defense 
attorney is able to freely represent his or her client without fearing reprisal 
or adverse career implications.110  The accused service member’s 
communications with the military defense counsel are also protected under 
the attorney-client privilege.111  Accused service members also receive free 
representation during the appellate process, although it is often a different 
attorney than the one that represented them before or during the trial; 
however, the new attorney often specializes in appellate practice.112 
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d. Article 32 Hearings 
The UCMJ provides any accused service member subject to a general 
court-martial the right to an Article 32 hearing.113  The intent behind an 
Article 32 hearing is threefold: “[to inquire] as to the truth of the matter set 
forth in the charges, consideration of the form of the charges, and a 
recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in 
the interest of justice and discipline.”114  Conducted prior to the referral 
charges, an investigating officer, appointed by the convening authority, will 
hear evidence, investigate the charges, and then provide a non-binding 
recommendation to the convening authority as to the disposition of the 
charges.115  The UCMJ does not provide a standard of proof for the 
investigating officer’s recommendation.  Instead, Rule for Court-Marital 
405(j)(2)(H) provides that the investigating officer should base his or her 
recommendation on “reasonable grounds to believe that the accused 
committed the offense alleged.”116 
The Article 32 hearing affords the accused substantial due process 
rights.  The accused has the right to be present for the investigation, to be 
represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to object to irrelevant 
or privileged evidence, to call witnesses and introduce evidence in his or 
her defense and mitigation to all evidence presented by the government, and 
to receive a copy of the investigating officer’s report, which is to include 
the summary of all the testimony taken at the hearing.117  Additionally, the 
recent National Defense Authorization provides that, when reasonably 
available, a judge advocate should serve as the investigating officer.118  This 
provision advances due process and, while the military branches differed in 
their approach, non-attorney line officers were often used as investigating 
officers. 
e. Use of Military Judges 
Although not required by the United States Supreme Court, the UCMJ 
provides that accused service members have the right to a military judge to 
preside over their special or general courts-martial.119  The role of military 
judges is central to the due process rung of the trinity because it shifts the 
 
113.  UCMJ art. 32; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at A22-58. 
114.  UCMJ art. 32(a). 
115.  R.C.M. 405(a). 
116.  R.C.M. 405(j)(2)(H). 
117.  See R.C.M. 405(f). 
118.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 88, at § 1702. 
119.  UCMJ art. 26(a); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 77, at II-74; R.C.M. 
801(a). 
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ability to mete out justice away from the commander and to a judge, who is 
then entrusted with “ensuring that the rules of procedure and evidence are 
applied and enforced.”120 
f. Trial Procedures 
Due process dominates court-martial trial procedures.  During courts-
martial, an accused service member is entitled to file motions to dismiss, 
motions to suppress evidence, motions for appropriate relief, and motions 
for continuances.121  Likewise, the military justice system affords accused 
service members the right to select their trial forum, with enlisted service 
members possessing the right to select trial by military judge alone, officer 
members, or officer and enlisted members.122  Officer members may elect 
trial by military judge alone or officer members.123  Accused service 
members are also able to exert their trial-specific constitutional rights, such 
as their Sixth Amendment right to confront any witness against them.124   
This provision is especially evident in the military justice system as, based 
upon the Confrontation Clause, the government cannot utilize video 
teleconference (“VTC”) or other alternative means to secure remote witness 
testimony over the accused service member’s objection.125 
g. Appellate Review 
The UCMJ requires that each military department establish a court of 
criminal appeals.126  Accused service members may then appeal their court-
martial conviction to their department’s appellate court.127  Appellate 
review is mandatory if the sentence includes death, a punitive discharge, or 
confinement of one year or more.128  Upon complete of appellate review at 
the department level, accused service members may then appeal an adverse 
decision to the Court of Appeal for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”).129  The 
United States Supreme Court may then review CAAF decisions.130  The 
military justice system embeds, within the appellate process, several other 
due process rights.  Specifically, these courts have independent “fact-
 
120.  Schlueter, supra note 18, at 66-67. 
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124.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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126.  UCMJ art. 66(a). 
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130.  UCMJ art. 67a; 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012). 
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finding powers which provide a convicted servicemember with an 
opportunity to argue that the conviction should be set aside because the 
evidence was insufficient.”131  Similarly, the appellate courts can review the 
sentence approved by the convening authority, including comparing it to 
sentences adjudged in other cases.132  Lastly, the appellate courts may 
remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on a specified issue.133            
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM—HOW 
THE EXPANSION OF DUE PROCESS MARGINALIZED THE 
COURT-MARTIAL WITHIN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The increase in due process greatly altered the military justice trinity.  
By strengthening the due process prong, Congress impacted the military 
justice system prong.  Specifically, the increase in due process resulted in 
the court-martial process becoming costly and time-consuming.  Seeking 
expedited discipline, commanders turned away from the court-martial 
process and opted for lesser but quicker means of punishment, especially 
nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges. 
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL THIS DUE PROCESS 
The increase in due process rights afforded to service members had a 
marked influence on military justice.  Most dramatically, both the number 
of courts-martial and the court-martial rates per thousand dramatically 
decreased.  In addition to courts-martial occurring less frequently, when 
they did occur, they became drawn-out affairs, involving long processing 
times and increasingly cumbersome procedures. 
1. Courts-Martial Utilized With Much Less Frequency 
The cumulative effect of the due process evolution was to marginalize 
the court-martial as a tool for commanders to effectuate good order and 
discipline.  Figure 3.0 below reflects the court-martial rates per thousand, 
beginning in 1913, for each military department.  In 1913, under the 
Articles of War, commanders often utilized courts-martial with 588 soldiers 
and 239 sailors or Marines per thousand facing court-martial.  Since then, 
commanders have utilized courts-martial less frequently with the court-
martial rate gradually decreasing to the point where, in 2013, only 2.77 
 
131.  Schluester, supra note 18, at 70.  See also UCMJ art. 66(c); MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, supra note 77, at II-171; R.C.M. 1203(b). 
132.  Schluester, supra note 18, at 71. 
133.  Id. 

          
2014] BACK TO THE FUTURE 513 
rarely utilize the court-martial to preserve good order and discipline within 
their units. 
2. When Utilized, Today’s Courts-Martial Are a Time-
Consuming and Cumbersome Process 
Due process marginalized the court-martial as a capability for 
commanders to effectuate good order and discipline because it rendered the 
court-martial overly cumbersome and time-consuming.  Almost 
immediately upon its passing in 1951, war in Korea tested the UCMJ.  
Commanders utilized the court-martial in Korea to varying levels of 
success, but found that the UCMJ hindered, more than assisted, in 
preserving good order and discipline.139  In 1953, a congressional 
committee consisting of military commanders, none of whom were 
attorneys, concluded that “professional standards have been permitted to 
deteriorate through lack of disciplinary control.  The adoption of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, with its unwieldy legal procedure, has 
made the effective administration of military discipline within the Armed 
Forces more difficult.”140 
Commanders in Vietnam expressed similar dissatisfaction with the 
UCMJ.141  While they attempted to use the military justice system to deter 
increased misconduct, the military justice system proved unresponsive.142  
The due process rights afforded to service members—the right to an 
attorney, a military judge, and an Article 32 investigation—“took a great 
deal of time, and caseloads on the few military lawyers in Vietnam were 
heavy.”143  Consequently, commanders often accepted favorable pretrial 
agreements or dismissed charges to avoid the laborious court-martial 
process.144  This apparent ineffectiveness of the military justice system to 
ensure good order and discipline led some critics to wonder whether “due 
process has become a fetish” creating a system that was “exceedingly 
expensive, complicated and slow moving.”145 
Recent statistics suggest that the courts-martial process continues to be 
time consuming.  Figure 3.1 depicts the processing times of Air Force 
 
139.  George S. Prugh, Observations on the UCMJ: 1954 and 2000, 165 MIL. L. REV. 21, 
29-30 (2000). 
140.  Id.  
141.  Id. at 40. 
142.  Id. at 33-34. 
143.  ALLISON, supra note 70, at 69-70. 
144.  Id. 
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courts-martial from 2010 to 2013.146  The Air Force initiates processing 
times at the date the offense was discovered and terminates the processing 
time when the convening authority takes final action.147  For all four years, 
the processing times for general courts-martial averaged around 400 
days.148  In contrast, processing times for special courts-martial fluctuated 
between 159 and 210 days, while summary courts-martial ranged from 38 
to 56 days.149  As such, when an airman engages in misconduct, the 
commander faces the possibility that, should he or she proceed with a court-
martial, the misconduct may not be resolved for another 200 or 400 days.  
To many commanders, the prospect of deferring resolution for 400 days 
renders the court-martial an unrealistic option. 
 
146.  HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, ARTICLE 6 PROCESSING TIMES REVIEW CALENDAR 
YEAR 2012, at 2 (2012); HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, ARTICLE 6 PROCESSING TIMES 
REVIEW CALENDAR YEAR 2013, at 2 (2013). 
147.  HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S. 
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2. 
148.  HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S. 
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2. 
149.  HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; HEADQUARTERS U.S. 
AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2. 
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Figure 3.1:  USAF Courts-Martial Processing Times, Date of Discovery to 
Final Action (days), 2010-2013 
 
B. THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ACHIEVE GOOD ORDER 
AND DISCIPLINE 
The UCMJ affords commanders alternate means to address service 
member misconduct.  Nonjudicial punishment, which allows a commander 
to impose fines, reduce enlisted members in rank, or impose additional 
duties, allows a commander an expedient and, at times, visible form of 
punishment.  Meanwhile, administrative discharges, which effectively “kick 
out” service members, allow a commander to quickly remove problematic 
soldiers.  In recent years, commanders have turned to these alternative 
options with increasing frequency, apparently at the cost of courts-martial. 
1. Nonjudicial Punishment 
With the advent of increased due process rights, commanders turned 
away from courts-martial and instead embraced nonjudicial punishment and 
administrative discharges to address misconduct within their units.  The 
initial UCMJ afforded commanders the power to impose nonjudicial 
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punishment.150  The severe nature of the confinement option led to 
commanders continuing to use the court-martial where more due process 
rights were afforded, rather than nonjudicial punishment.151  In the early 
1960s, however, the military departments advocated to reform Article 15, 
mainly by removing commanders’ authority to impose confinement.152  As 
such, in 1962, Congress lessened the punishment afforded under Article 
15.153  In turn, commanders began to utilize nonjudicial punishment with 
increased frequency, leading to a steep decline in courts-martial.154  Figure 
3.2 represents the steep decline in Navy and Air Force court-martial rates 
after commanders had the increased ability to impose nonjudicial 
punishment.155 
 
Figure 3.2:  Court-Martial Rates per Thousand, 1963-1965 
 Army Navy Air Force 
1963 65.4 45.7 14.8 
1964 73.0 29.2 8.8 
1965 67.5 28.4 5.9 
 
In recent years, the relationship between nonjudicial punishment and 
courts-martial rates appears to have stabilized.  Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 
represent the courts-martial rates per thousand compared to the nonjudicial 
punishment rates per thousand for each department from 1979 to 2013.156  
These figures are pertinent for several reasons.  First, they indicate each 
department experienced a dramatic decline in nonjudicial punishment rates 
in the 1980s from which they have not recovered.  Second, with the decline 
in nonjudicial punishment rates per thousand, none of the departments 
experienced a significant increase in courts-martial rates per thousand.  
Taken together, these figures indicate that beginning in the 1980s, 
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154.  Id. 
155.  HILLMAN, supra note 51, at Table B.1. 
156.  The Annual Reports of the United States Court of Military Appeals provided the 
courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment rates for 1979-2013. 
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Figure 3.5:  Air Force Courts-Martial and Nonjudicial Punishment Rates 
per Thousand, 1979-2013 
 
2.  Administrative Discharges 
There is strong evidence to suggest that commanders are increasingly 
turning towards administrative discharges when faced with allegations of 
misconduct.  Commanders began turning away from courts-martial and 
towards administrative discharges almost immediately upon the UCMJ’s 
implementation.  In 1958, the Air Force Judge Advocate General, Major 
General Reginald Harmon, attributed the decrease in the Air Force’s courts-
martial rate to the fact that “many commanders are using the legally 
authorized administrative discharge procedures instead of trial by court-
martial to take care of and get rid of offenders.”157  Commanders 
throughout the service became “overwhelmed by what they regarded as 
unreasonable complexities in court-martial law and practices” and as such, 
“looked for simpler ways to handle their delinquency problems.”158 
This trend continued into the 1970s as the Army Judge Advocate General 
acknowledged that an increase in commanders electing to administratively 
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discharge soldiers accused of misconduct was responsible for the decrease 
in courts-martial rates.159  Within the military leadership at that time, the 
commonly held viewpoint became “[a]dministrative separations could 
eliminate servicemembers quickly and quietly.”160  Overall, between 1950 
and 1973, corresponding to the development of the UCMJ and subsequent 
due process reforms, “the percentage of undesirable discharges issued 
through administrative, rather than court-martial, proceedings climbed 
dramatically, from 64 percent in the early 1950s Army to 92 percent by the 
early 1970s, and from 40 percent in the early 1950s Navy to 66 percent by 
the early 1970s.”161 
The preference for the speed and efficiency for administrative 
discharges remains today.  In its Annual Military Justice Report for fiscal 
year 2013, the Marine Corps compared its total number of special courts-
martial against the total number of administrative discharge boards from 
2007 to 2013.162  In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps conducted 
approximately 800 special courts-martial and only 300 administrative 
discharge boards.163  By fiscal year 2010, however, they performed 
approximately the same amount of administrative discharge boards and 
special courts-martial, around 600 of each.164  In fiscal year 2013, though, 
they performed approximately 800 administrative discharge boards 
compared to only 300 special courts-martial.165  This dramatic reversal of 
fortunes reflects that commanders are increasingly selecting the more 
expedient option of administrative discharge over the more costly and time-
consuming option of a court-martial. 
In sum, since World War I, Congress gradually increased the amount 
of due process afforded to accused service members.  By increasing the 
weight of the due process prong of the military justice trinity, Congress 
greatly impacted the military justice system.  The court-martial process, 
once the primary tool of the commander to achieve good order and 
discipline, became time-consuming and dominated by due process.  As a 
result, commanders utilized the court-martial with increasingly less 
frequency and instead turned to less restrictive means to deal with instances 
 
159.  CODE COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
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160.  HILLMAN, supra note 51, at 20. 
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of misconduct, specifically nonjudicial punishment and administrative 
discharge. 
IV. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE WITHOUT THE COURT-
MARTIAL—HOW DUE PROCESS’S MARGINALIZING OF THE 
COURT-MARTIAL PROCESS PREVENTS A COMMANDER 
FROM PRESERVING GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 
What then is the impact of due process’s marginalization of the court-
martial process on good order and discipline?  This section argues that the 
court-martial is essential for commanders to effectuate good order and 
disciple.  To effectively preserve good order and discipline, commanders 
must be able to use punishment to deter misconduct.  It is the court-martial, 
more so than nonjudicial punishment or administrative discharge, which 
provides this capability to commanders.  As such, without the court-martial, 
commanders lose the ability to effectively preserve good order and 
discipline. 
The relationship between good order and discipline and the other two 
prongs is of vital importance.  It is through good order and discipline that 
Congress and the military departments may find the root cause and solution 
to the recent bouts of service member misconduct.  To understand the role 
and importance of good order and discipline, as well as its relationship to 
the military justice system and due process, it is necessary to establish a 
thorough understanding of what exactly good order and discipline is, why it 
is important, who is responsible for it, and how it is achieved. 
A. WHAT IS GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE? 
Good order and discipline has long been an essential component of 
military campaigns.  Studying the jurist Quintis Sertorius’ successes against 
the Roman army, Plutarch focused on Sertorius’ ability to bring good order 
and discipline to the seemingly barbaric tribes of the Roman frontier.166  
Plutarch noted that after the campaigns against Rome, Sertorius was “highly 
honored for his introducing discipline and good order amongst them, for he 
altered their furious, savage manner of fighting . . . out of a confused 
number of thieves and robbers he constituted a regular, well-disciplined 
army.”167  In modern times, the primacy of good order and discipline to 
achieve military objectives remains.  Operation Enduring Freedom veterans 
regularly comment on the capability of Taliban forces in Afghanistan.  
 
166.  PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 687 (Arthur Hugh 
Clough ed., John Drydon trans., Random House 2d ed. 1992). 
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Although they expected disorganized and undisciplined fighters, these 
veterans instead faced a highly organized and structured force with Taliban 
commanders exercising good order and discipline to achieve military 
objectives.168 
Despite the accepted norm that good order and discipline is important, 
the actual definition of the term is murky at best.  Part of the problem is that 
attorneys—both civilian and military—manage the relationship between 
good order and discipline and the military justice system, as opposed to 
military commanders.  Attorneys tend to follow the Supreme Court and 
accept that war is a separate sphere best left to combat professionals, and 
good order and discipline falls within that sphere.169  These scholars tend to 
acknowledge that good order and discipline is important and then move 
onto the more legally-centered military justice system. 
In addition, military doctrine does not directly define good order and 
discipline.  Joint Publication 1, the doctrine behind the joint force, 
establishes who is responsible for discipline in the joint environment, but 
fails to define it.170  Army and Air Force leadership doctrines discuss the 
need for leaders to exercise self-discipline and intra-unit discipline, but both 
focus on how to achieve discipline, as opposed to what it is.171 
Attempts to define the term in the past have focused more on the 
discipline portion than the good order portion.  For example, a 1960 
commission consisting of high-ranking officers defined good order and 
discipline as “a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order 
no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be performed . . . .”172  A 
more thorough definition is utilized by the Air Force in its annual Air Force 
Officer’s Guide.  There, the Air Force defines good order and discipline as: 
Military discipline is intelligent, willing, and positive 
obedience to the will of the leader.  Its basis rests upon the 
voluntary subordination of the individual to the welfare of 
the group.  It is the cohesive force that binds the members 
of a unit, and its strict enforcement is a benefit for all.  Its 
constraint must be felt not so much in the fear of 
 
168.  REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 9. 
169.  See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (“[i]t is difficult to conceive of an 
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punishment as in the moral obligation it imposes on the 
individual to heed the common interests of the group.  
Discipline establishes a state of mind that produces proper 
action and prompt cooperation under all circumstances, 
regardless of obstacles.  It creates in the individual a desire 
and determination to undertake and accomplish any 
mission assigned by the leader.173 
This definition has proven to be enduring; it appears unchanged in 
thirty-five editions, encompassing most of the Air Force’s existence.  It is 
also thorough and addresses obedience to military leaders, the primacy of 
such obedience to mission readiness, and also the need for unit cohesion, 
which speaks to the good order portion of good order and discipline.  As 
such, this definition shall provide the basis for the understanding of good 
order and discipline in the following discussions. 
B. WHY DOES GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE MATTER? 
While addressing why good order and discipline matters, it is easy to 
rely solely on the argument that good order and discipline enables 
successful military operations.  The answer is more nuanced, however.  In 
combat, the military requires service members to do three things often 
against human nature:  put oneself at risk to be killed, to kill, and, at times, 
not kill when threatened.174  Additionally, both before and during combat, 
the military mandates that service members subordinate personal interests 
in favor of the group to foster unit cohesion.  Made possible through good 
order and discipline, these elements help ensure mission success. 
1. The Need to Place Service Members at Risk 
American history is peppered with instances of commanders ordering 
service members to put themselves at near risk of death.  Whether storming 
Bunker Hill, Pickett’s Hill, the beaches of Normandy, or the urban 
landscape of Fallujah, service members have faced an overwhelming risk of 
death to achieve military objectives.175  At times, the risk presented even 
guaranteed death.  During the combined bomber offensive in World War II, 
the Army Air Corps suffered dramatic losses.  Army statisticians used 8th 
Air Force’s loss rates and the number of flights required to return home to 
calculate that Army Air Corps’ pilots faced a one hundred percent certainty 
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of death during the course of the war.176  Despite these daunting odds, 
service members continue to engage in these operations.  It is good order 
and discipline, with its emphasis on creating a state of mind within service 
members to follow the will of their commanders, which enables 
commanders to order their service members at risk to achieve mission 
objectives and to have their service members follow the orders. 
2. The Need to Have Service Members Kill 
The harsh reality of war is that commanders must ask their service 
members to kill to achieve mission success.177  Commanders cannot assume 
obedience from their service members when it comes to killing.  Studies 
reflect that service members are often reluctant to actually engage the 
enemy once in contact.178  For example, during World War II, only fifteen 
to twenty percent of combat infantry were willing to fire their rifles.179  This 
reluctance relates to the idea that “within each person a force that 
understands at some gut level that all humanity is inextricably 
interdependent and that to harm any part is to harm the whole . . . .”180  
Marcus Aurelius contemplated this inner belief in his command of the 
Roman Army, positing “every individual dispensation is one of the causes 
of the prosperity, success, and even survival of that which administers the 
universe.  To break of any particle, no matter how small, from the 
continuous concatenation—whether of cause or of any other elements—is 
to injure the whole.”181  In combat, though, commanders must rely upon 
good order and discipline to break their service members of this mindset 
and instead develop the willingness to kill when ordered to do so. 
3. The Need to Have Service Members Not Kill 
Today’s military is not limited to conventional warfare. The joint force 
is organized “across a range that extends from military engagement, 
security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited 
contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations.”182  Within 
this range of military operations fall several operations, such as civil 
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support, foreign humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency (“COIN”), 
where the use of lethal force will impede and damage the mission.183 
Restraint, though, may be easier said than done.  COIN speaks to the 
inherent difficulty of exercising restraint in a kinetic environment.  
Commanders leading COIN operations utilize their service members to win 
the hearts and minds of the local population.184  They do so with the 
understanding that by killing one innocent civilian, a service member may 
create five insurgents.185  To the service member conducting COIN, 
however, he or she must be “ready to be greeted with either handshake or a 
hand grenade while taking on missions.”186  When operating in a combat 
environment, it is natural for a service member to utilize lethal force when 
threatened.  In COIN, however, the service member must show restraint 
when threatened because, if the grenade is actually a handshake, the effect 
of killing may have dire strategic consequences.187  As such, it falls upon 
the commander to instill within his or her service members the restraint 
necessary to not kill when the mission requires. 
4. Unit Cohesion 
Unit cohesion is essential for military operations.  It is unit cohesion 
that allows for a group of disparate service members to subject their 
personal fears and desires to the collective well-being and the success of the 
fighting force.  Research indicates that “the primary factor that motivates a 
soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to do in combat (that is, 
killing and dying) is not the force of self-preservation but a powerful sense 
of accountability to his comrades in the battlefield.”188  The importance of 
unit cohesion extends from the battlefield to the home station.  In garrison, 
unit cohesion speaks to the readiness of the unit and the ties that bind them 
as a potential fighting force.  A breakdown in unit cohesion in garrison is 
likely to lead to a further breakdown in combat, resulting in potentially 
tragic results.  Inherent in the definition of good order and discipline is the 
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C. WHO BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOOD ORDER AND 
DISCIPLINE? 
In the debate about the continued role of commanders in the military 
justice system, there is one consistent point of agreement between critics 
and advocates—commanders are responsible for good order and discipline 
within their units.  Commanders bear the responsibility of the welfare, 
morale, mission readiness, and safety of their service members, and, in 
combat, direct actions of service members that may result in their death.  
Consequently, the responsibility for good order and discipline can only fall 
upon the commander.  But what commander? 
In today’s increasingly bureaucratic and integrated military, service 
members have several different commanders.  Service members serve under 
their immediate commander, but they are often under at least three superior 
commanders.  As the level of command grows, the more likely it is that the 
superior commander will be geographically separated from the service 
member.190  The identification of the commander becomes even more 
difficult if the service member deploys.  While deployed, a service member 
may serve under a joint commander, a service commander, and under the 
command of the service member’s home station.191  The multiple layers of 
command make it difficult to assess which of these commanders is 
ultimately responsible for good order and discipline. 
Studies reflect that military service places the immediate commander 
in the best position to bear the responsibility for good order and discipline.  
Proximity is the key.  A World War II study examined instances where 
American soldiers engaged enemy forces with fire and incidents when they 
did not.192  The study found that “almost all soldiers would fire their 
weapons while their leaders observed and encouraged them in a combat 
situation.”193  In comparison, when the commander left, “the firing rate 
 
190.  For example, an airman assigned to Moody Air Force Base in Valdosta, Georgia, most 
likely has a squadron commander, a group commander, and a wing commander, all co-located 
with him or her at the installation.  The airman then falls under a Numbered Air Force 
Commander at Shaw Air Force Base in Sumter, South Carolina and also under Major Command 
Commander located at Joint Base Langley in Hampton Roads, Virginia.  Most likely, the airman 
has little, if any, interaction with his or her wing commander, let alone the higher-level 
commanders located in different states. 
191.  For example, in the deployed environment, he or she may fill a joint tasking as an 
individual augmentee.  There, he or she may work for a non-Air Force military commander, but 
also be under the command of an Air Force expeditionary wing commander located somewhere in 
theater.  Beyond the expeditionary wing commander, the airman falls under the command of the 
Air Forces Central Command commander, located at Shaw Air Force Base. 
192.  GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 144. 
193.  Id. 
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immediately dropped to 15 to 20 percent.”194  Similarly, in 2013, a number 
of commanders testified before the Department of Defense’s Defense Legal 
Policy Board concerning their experiences commanding in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.195  Each commander testified that they bore the ultimate and 
immediate responsibility of good order and discipline for each of the 
service members under their joint command, even if an individual service 
member fell under the command of several other levels of service-specific 
command.196  As one Army commander noted: 
I was there.  I saw these troops every day.   I made sure 
they had food to eat, toilet paper to wipe themselves, and a 
place to sleep.  I was the one that was going to ask them to 
kill and I was the one going to ask them to die.  An Airman, 
Sailor, or Marine may have answered to a different 
commander somewhere, but when he was in my 
battlespace, he was my responsibility.197 
D. HOW DO COMMANDERS ACHIEVE GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE? 
Good order and discipline presents a daunting task for commanders.  A 
commander needs to instill into his or her service members’ mindset a sense 
of uncompromising obedience and duty.  This mindset must then lead to 
service members putting themselves at grave risk—to kill or not to kill—all 
at the order of their commander.  How does the commander make the 
seemingly impossible possible?  What tools does he or she need to make 
this mindset a reality?  The answer lies in both positive and negative means, 
the negative means linking the good order and discipline prong of the trinity 
to the military justice prong. 
1. Positive Means 
Positive rewards and reinforcement enable a commander to achieve 
good order and discipline by ascribing a sense of loyalty and affection 
amongst his or her service members.198  While describing Sertorius’ ability 
to achieve good order and discipline within his troops, Plutarch did not 
mention discipline or fear.  Instead, he noted Sertorius: 
bestowed silver and gold upon them liberally to gild and 
adorn their helmets, he had their shields worked with 
various figures and designs, he brought them into the mode 
 
194.  Id. 
195.  See generally REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 2. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 231 (quoting Brigadier General Gary Volesky). 
198.  GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 145. 
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of wearing flowered and embroidered cloaks and coats, and 
by supplying money for these purposes, and joining with 
them in all improvements, he won the hearts of all.199 
Sertorius recognized that to obtain the uncontested obedience of his 
disparate troops, they would have to feel ties of affection and loyalty to 
him; otherwise, they would not willingly submit to his command.  Recent 
studies confirm that bonds of loyalty are essential to commanders 
exercising good order and discipline.200  A 1973 study demonstrated that 
“the primary factor in ensuring the will to fight is identification with the 
direct commanding officer.”201  In this study, respected and established 
commanders were able to gain compliance from soldiers in combat much 
more effectively than unknown or disrespected leaders.202  While 
commanders today cannot provide their service members with gold or 
money, they can provide positive rewards and reinforcement through a 
variety of means, including: awards, decorations, promotions, positive 
performance reviews, and morale activities. 
2. Negative Means 
Commanders cannot rely on positive reinforcement alone to effectuate 
good order and discipline.  To ensure good order and discipline within their 
units, commanders must be able to hold service members accountable for 
acts of misconduct.203  Commanders do so via the ability to impose 
punishment.204  Beyond accountability, one of the primary purposes of 
punishment is deterrence, both specific and general.  By punishing service 
members for misconduct that strikes at good order and discipline, 
commanders are not only able to deter the offending service member from 
again committing misconduct, but are also able to deter the other members 
of the unit from committing misconduct. 
It is here that good order and discipline and the military justice system 
meet.  The UCMJ serves as the “primary tool for administering legal 
consequences for breaches of discipline.”205  Under the UCMJ, 
commanders possess a range of punishment options ranging from the 
administrative to the nonjudicial to the court-martial.  Through this ability, 
 
199.  PLUTARCH, supra note 166, at 687. 
200.  GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 145. 
201.  Id. at 144. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 9. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
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commanders are supposed to be able to deter misconduct, thereby ensuring 
good order and discipline within their units. 
E. HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE CURRENT MILITARY JUSTICE TRINITY IN 
ACHIEVING GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE? 
Commanders increasingly utilize nonjudicial punishment and 
administrative discharge tools to address service member misconduct.  
Consequently, the question then turns to how well do these lesser forms of 
punishment, as compared to the more severe option of the court-martial, 
deter service member misconduct.  Criminology provides a basic 
framework to understand what factors best deter crime.  This framework 
can be applied to service member misconduct and proves helpful in 
determining what means of punishment—the court-martial, nonjudicial 
punishment, or administrative discharge—best deters service member 
misconduct. 
1. Deterrence Theory:  How Best to Deter Misconduct 
Deterrence theory identifies several factors that deter crime:  credibility of 
punishment, severity of punishment, celerity of punishment, and collateral 
effects of punishment.206  Of these factors, studies reflect that the credibility 
of punishment—the belief that if an individual engages in crime, he or she 
will be caught and punished—best deters crime.207  The more an individual 
believes that he or she will be caught, the less likely he or she is to commit 
the offense.208  Closely related to credibility of punishment is the severity of 
the punishment.  On its own, severity of punishment has little correlation to 
deterrence.209  A rational actor is unlikely to be deterred by the severity of 
the punishment if he or she does not believe there is a credible chance that 
he or she will be caught and punished.210  If, however, there is a high degree 
of credibility, the severity of punishment correlates to deterrence.211  The 
likelihood of individuals engaging in a crime if they believe they will be 
caught further decreases as the level of severity in punishment increases.212 
 
206.  See generally Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and 
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001). 
207.  Id. at 870. 
208.  Id. at 880. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
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Concerning celerity, classical deterrence theory posited that for 
punishment to have a deterrent effect, it must be swift and immediately 
proceed the misconduct.213  While recent studies reflect a minimal 
correlation between the celerity of a punishment and deterrence, it appears 
too soon to discount the deterrent effect of celerity.214  Criminologists 
suggest that celerity may still play an important role in deterrence and 
warrants further research and studies.215 
Recent studies also indicate that the collateral effects of punishment 
may have a deterrent effect.216  For example, in a study examining the 
deterrence effects of a driving under the influence (“DUI”) conviction, 
researchers indicated that the “extra-legal” consequences of a DUI 
conviction, including the shame of a conviction, the inability to drive, and 
the future recognition that they were convicted of a DUI, deterred DUI 
offenses with as much correlation as the legal sanctions of confinement and 
fines.217  Overall, deterrence theory establishes that a high credibility of 
punishment, coupled with severity, best deters crime and that collateral 
effects and celerity of punishment also contribute to deterring misconduct. 
2. Deterrence Theory Applied to the Current Military Justice 
Trinity 
When applying this framework to the current military justice trinity, it 
becomes evident that none of the current forms of punishment effectively 
deter service member misconduct.  In its current state, the court-martial 
process cannot deter misconduct.  To be deterred, a service member must 
find the risk of being caught and punished to be credible.  With a court-
martial rate averaging around two service members per thousand218, the 
court-martial process does not support a credible belief that service 
members will be caught and punished.  A service member is unlikely to 
know someone who has been subject to court-martial, hear of a service 
member facing a court-martial for similar misconduct, or be exposed to the 
consequences of a court-martial.  Thus, with a marginalized court-martial 
process, service members do not find the risk of punishment to be credible. 
Similarly, celerity in the court-martial process is lacking.  Courts-
martial, especially general courts-martial, take a long time from the 
 
213.  Id. at 885. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id.  
216.  Id. at 881-82. 
217.  Id. at 882. 
218.  See generally CODE COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 159.  
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discovery of the offense to final action.219  Hence, a service member is 
likely to change assignments, deploy, or separate prior to the completion of 
a court-martial action, reducing further the deterrent effect of the current 
court-martial process.  While courts-martial continue to provide for severe 
punishments and collateral consequences, the lack of credibility and celerity 
provided by the court-martial process undermines the deterrent value of the 
present day court-martial system. 
Likewise, nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges 
provide little deterrent effect to service member misconduct.  Admittedly, 
the frequency of nonjudicial punishment and the ever-increasing frequency 
of administrative discharges may enhance the credibility of punishment.  As 
more service members receive nonjudicial punishment or are 
administratively discharged for instances of misconduct, other service 
members are likely to find it more credible that they will be caught and 
punished for similar misconduct.  However, the non-public nature of 
nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges undercuts the 
credibility that these punishments provide.  Unlike a court-martial, 
nonjudicial proceedings are private.220  While other service members may 
be aware that a service member received nonjudicial punishment and the 
offending service members may publically display such punishment 
through a visible reduction in rank, the underlying offense is not necessarily 
publicized or apparent.  Similarly, while an administrative discharge board 
may be public, administrative discharges are often handled absent a public 
hearing.221  While an individual’s separation is apparent, the basis for the 
separation may not be. 
Even if nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges provide 
a certain amount of credibility, the lack of severity regarding these 
punishments further undermines their deterrent effectiveness.  Nonjudicial 
punishment does not allow for confinement or separation, either 
administratively or punitively.222  As such, the most a commander can do is 
fine an accused, provide additional duties, reprimand, restrict an individual 
to base, or reduce a service member in rank.223  The options lessen when the 
 
219.  See HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2012, supra note 146, at 2; see also 
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE, 2013, supra note 146, at 2. 
220.  See UCMJ art. 15.   
221.  See generally John Brooker et.al., Beyond ‘T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of 
a Former Services Member’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge 
from the Armed Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1, 128 (2012). 
222.  UCMJ art. 15. 
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accused service member is an officer and the commander loses the ability to 
reduce the officer in rank.224 
Concerning administrative discharges, separation from the military 
may not even be a punishment to many accused service members.  With 
service commitments and the prospects of deploying to a combat zone, 
many service members may welcome the opportunity to separate early, 
regardless of their service characterization.225  For those service members 
who do not desire an early separation, administrative discharges fail to 
provide severe punishment.  While a service member will be effectively 
“fired,” the lasting effects are minimal.  The commander may separate the 
service member with an honorable, general, or under other than honorable 
conditions (“UOTHC”) discharge.226  Both a general and UOTHC 
discharge characterization prevents the service member from enjoying the 
full benefits of previous military service, but neither of these 
characterizations involve confinement or the negative legal and social 
stigmas of a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge.227   Overall, the lack of 
confinement or punitive discharge options prevents nonjudicial punishment 
or administrative discharges from providing effective deterrence of service 
member misconduct. 
A court-martial, though, used frequently and with celerity, provides 
the most effective deterrence for a commander.  If commanders utilize a 
court-martial with increased frequency, service members will begin to 
believe that if they engage in misconduct, they will not only be caught, but 
will also be punished.  Similarly, the severity of punishment afforded by the 
court-martial, including substantial confinement and punitive discharges, 
will increase deterrence when coupled with the increased level of credibility 
of punishment.228  Furthermore, the court-martial carries with it several 
collateral effects.  Convicted service members will in most cases be 
convicted felons and lose federal rights accordingly.229  They will carry 
with them the shame of a federal conviction and the possibility of a punitive 
discharge, which will limit future employment options.230  Therefore, to 
achieve the appropriate level of deterrence to ensure good order and 
discipline, commanders need a frequent and efficient court-martial process. 
 
224.  Id. 
225.  See Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 10. 
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The need for a fully realized court-martial process, however, should 
not blind commanders.  Underlying the need to use punishment for good 
order and discipline is the requirement that service members view this 
punishment as legitimate.231  Here lies the continued role for due process in 
the military justice trinity.  While the increase in due process may have 
rendered the court-martial process an ineffective tool for commanders to 
deter service member misconduct, due process also provides a sense of 
fairness and legitimacy to the court-martial process.  Thus, commanders 
cannot neglect due process when relying upon the court-martial process to 
preserve good order and discipline. 
In sum, commanders can only preserve good order and discipline 
within their units if they have the ability to deter misconduct through 
punishment.  According to deterrence theory, commanders need 
punishment that is credible, severe, swift, and possesses collateral 
consequences to effectively deter misconduct.  Additionally, the 
punishment imposed must be viewed as legitimate and just in order to have 
a deterrent effect.  The current military justice trinity fails in its 
responsibility to provide that deterrent effect. 
While the due process prong provides legitimacy and fairness, it 
renders the court-martial a marginalized tool.  Consequently, the current 
court-martial process is not credible.  The alternative means of 
punishment—nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges—
provide some credibility, but lack the severity and collateral effects of a 
court-martial, thereby minimizing their deterrence.  It is the fully-realized 
court-martial process, with its allotment of severe punishment and collateral 
effects, when used with frequency and celerity, that best provides the 
commander with the capacity to deter through punishment. 
V. RESTORING THE TRINITY—RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORM 
The current military justice trinity is not properly balanced.  Congress, 
the military appellate courts, and the military departments expanded due 
process at the cost of the military justice system.  By rendering the court-
martial process an overly cumbersome and time-consuming process, the 
expansion of due process restricted commanders’ ability to effectuate good 
order and discipline—the results of which are apparent in the recent high-
profile bouts of misconduct throughout the military departments.  The 
 
231.  Theurer & Russell, supra note 15, at 9 (citing Kenneth Butterfield, et al.  
Organizational Punishment from the Manager’s Perspective: An Explanatory Study, J. OF 
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question then turns to how should Congress and the military departments 
balance the military justice trinity. 
The Articles of War represent the ultimate emphasis on good order and 
discipline.  Absent much due process, the Articles of War allowed a 
commander to quickly and directly utilize the court-martial process to 
effectuate good order and discipline.  Nonetheless, as evidenced by the calls 
for reform in World War I and World War II, the confluence of good order 
and discipline and the military justice system, at the expense of due process, 
was not the proper balance.  Discipline must be legitimate; without due 
process the rampant use of court-martials was de-legitimized. 
Additionally, a return to the limited-to-none due process model would 
not be a realistic option today.  The fact that Congress, the military 
appellate courts, and the military departments have provided due process 
rights to accused service members creates a Flowers for Algernon type 
situation should Congress seek to take much of those rights away.232  
Service members and the public are accustomed to accused service 
members having basic constitutional rights, such as the right to an attorney, 
military judge, a trial by jury, and a review of their case.  Congress and the 
military departments would face much criticism for removing these rights, 
which, in turn, could negatively impact morale within the services and 
challenge the legitimacy of the military justice process. 
With the current and historical balances insufficient, Congress and the 
military departments should seize this opportunity to strike the proper 
balance.  The key to finding the right balance is the appropriate level of due 
process.  While recognizing that due process plays an essential role in the 
military justice trinity, Congress and the military departments should limit 
the extra-constitutional due process rights afforded to accused service 
members.233  By scaling back accused service members’ extra due process 
 
232.  See generally DANIEL KEYES, FLOWERS FOR ALGERNON (2005).  In Flowers for 
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medical experiment where researchers were able to make him a genius.  A happy individual 
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233.  See James M. Hirschhorn. The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and 
Servicemen’s Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 178 (1984) (“[A] stable majority of the 
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which greater than usual restrictions on individual liberty are required.  In practice, the Court has 
given considerable, though not clearly delineated, deference to decisions by Congress or the 
military authorities that restrict the political expression, access to political activity, and right to 
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process rights afforded to accused service members with the extent of that de-escalation 
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rights and restoring the viability of the court-martial as a tool for good order 
and discipline, Congress and the military departments will strengthen the 
military justice system prong.  In turn, the good order and discipline prong 
will grow in strength and commanders will have the capability to deter 
serious misconduct. 
To achieve these ends, the military departments and Congress can 
begin by identifying extra-constitutional rights throughout the court-martial 
process and then scaling back those rights.  Beyond reducing specific due 
process rights, the military departments should develop a culture where the 
goal of military law is good order and discipline.  But before implementing 
any reform, including increases and decreases in due process, the direct and 
indirect effects on good order and discipline should be weighed. 
A. LIMITING ACCUSED SERVICE MEMBERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
The military justice trinity is a delicate balance.  Due process is 
especially delicate; a haphazard or piecemeal approach may not only fail to 
revitalize the court-martial as an effective tool for discipline, but may also 
delegitimize the entire process.  As such, the military departments should 
assess due process at the structural, pretrial, trial, and post-trial levels. 
1. Structural Reform—Eliminate the Distinction Between Special 
and General Courts-Martial 
The distinction between a special and general courts-martial provides 
increased due process rights to an accused service member.  A general 
court-martial, conducted in instances of serious misconduct, includes 
multiple levels of review.234  Upon preferral of charges, the special court-
martial convening authority reviews the charges and then forwards the 
charges, along with a recommendation, to the general court-martial 
convening authority—a superior commander.235  The general court-martial 
convening authority then determines whether to refer the charges to a 
general court-martial.236  The two levels of review, and the ultimate 
decision of referral resting with a superior commander, provides additional 
process for accused service members to ensure their rights are not being 
violated. 
These additional layers of review also prolong the process.  As Figure 
3.1237 portrays, between 2010 and 2013 general courts-martial averaged 
 
234.  UCMJ arts. 66-67a; R.C.M. 1201-1210. 
235.  R.C.M. 404 
236.  R.C.M. 601 
237.  See supra Part III.A.2.  
          
2014] BACK TO THE FUTURE 535 
about 200 more days to process than special courts-martial.238  While the 
time disparity partly relates to the increased complexity of offenses referred 
to general courts-martial as compared to special courts-martial, which 
causes general courts-martial to require more investigative time between the 
date of discovery and preferral, the additional layers of review also add time 
to the process.  Furthermore, resting the referral authority for a general 
court-martial with the superior commander distances the immediate 
commander from the court-martial process.  While the immediate 
commander may prefer charges, the ultimate decision whether to refer the 
case to trial resides at least two levels above the immediate commander.  
Consequently, when electing disciplinary action, the immediate commander 
may be hesitant to elect a court-martial because he or she knows the case 
will be resolved well above his or her level. 
As such, Congress and the military departments should eliminate the 
distinction between special and general courts-martial.  Instead, an 
immediate commander should be responsible for the preferral of charges 
against his or her service members.  The decision to refer should then reside 
with the current special court-martial convening authority, who is often co-
located with the immediate commander and more directly involved with the 
day-to-day operations and discipline of the installation. 
Removing the additional layer of review will not only decrease 
processing times, but it will give the immediate commander and his or her 
directly superior commander greater responsibility and ownership over their 
cases.  To prevent misuse of this authority, the special court-martial 
convening authority’s staff judge advocate should have the discretion to 
recommend that the special court-martial convening authority’s immediate 
commander—the current general court-martial convening authority—
review the case.  This recommendation should only occur when the special 
court-martial convening authority refuses to refer charges, and, in the judge 
advocate’s opinion, the facts of the case warrant trial by court-martial.  
Overall, by streamlining the court-martial process, cases will proceed to 
trial more quickly and lower-level commanders will be more invested in 
their cases, which, in turn, may increase their willingness to utilize the 
court-martial process to effectuate good order and discipline. 
2. Pretrial Reforms 
During the pretrial process, accused service members receive extra-
constitutional due process rights in the form of Article 32 investigations and 
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an abundance of discovery rights.  While these additional due process rights 
were intended to provide protections to accused service members and serve 
as a check on commanders, they make courts-martials increasingly 
laborious and time consuming.  The military departments should address 
these issues by modeling Article 32 investigations and discovery rights on 
their federal practice counterparts. 
a. Eliminate Article 32 Hearings in Favor of a Grand Jury 
System 
Currently, accused service members have a right to an Article 32 
hearing when the special court-martial convening authority recommends to 
the general court-martial convening authority that preferred charges should 
be referred to a general court-martial.239  Initially, Article 32 hearings had a 
limited purpose: mainly “to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in 
the charges, the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to 
determine what disposition should be made of the case.”240  In practice, 
though, Article 32 hearings have developed into “mini-trials.”  Because of 
the additional rights provided to accused service members in Article 32 
hearings, specifically, “the rights to counsel, cross-examination, and 
presentation of evidence,”241 the government must invest substantial time 
and resources in preparing for the Article 32 hearing, which includes 
witness travel and complying with defense discovery requests. 
As a result, Article 32 hearings are time consuming.  For example, in 
2012, the Air Force averaged thirty-five days from preferral of charges to 
the Article 32 hearing.242  The Air Force then averaged twenty-four days 
from the completion of the Article 32 hearing to referral of charges, thereby 
averaging fifty-nine days from preferral of charges to referral of charges.243  
In comparison, in 2012, the Air Force averaged nine days between preferral 
and referral of charges in special courts-martial where accused service 
members were not afforded the right to an Article 32 hearing.244 
Similarly, in 2013, the Air Force averaged forty-one days from 
preferral to the Article 32 hearing and twenty-two days between the Article 
32 hearing and referral of charges, for a total of sixty-three days between 
preferral and referral.245  Meanwhile, that same year, the Air Force 
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averaged twelve days from preferral to referral of charges in specials 
courts-martial.246 
To increase the expediency of the court-martial process, Congress and 
the military departments should eliminate the Article 32 hearing process 
and instead adopt a system closely related to the federal grand jury process.  
Within the federal system, the government must secure a grand jury 
indictment of an accused before the case can proceed to trial.247  The federal 
system affords the accused very little rights within the grand jury system.  
For example, the accused does not have a right to be present, to be 
represented by counsel, to confront witnesses, or even to be aware of the 
proceedings.  In addition, there is no judge present, the prosecutor is not 
bound by any rules of evidence and may introduce improperly seized 
evidence, and the proceedings are performed in secret, with the accused not 
permitted to receive a transcript of the proceedings.248  The government 
also possesses the light standard of probable cause to secure an 
indictment249 
Such a system can be applied to the military justice system.  Upon the 
preferral of charges, a convening authority may convene a grand jury-like 
board before which the designated trial counsel can present the 
government’s case and not be bound by the rules of evidence or subject to 
the presence of the accused service member.  The designated grand jury 
board can then determine whether the government meets its probable cause 
standard and provide a recommendation to the convening authority. 
Unlike in the federal system, the recommendation should not be 
binding, as the convening authority is ultimately responsible for military 
discipline.  However, the process ensures that the government possesses 
probable cause to proceed further with the case.  The end result of the 
process is that the government would be able to proceed more quickly 
between the preferral of charges and referral of charges without perfecting 
its case in anticipation of the Article 32 hearing while also ensuring that 
there remains some check on the government’s ability to bring charges to 
trial. 
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b. Bring Discovery Rights in Line with Federal Discovery 
Rights 
Civilian and military courts share a basic understanding of an accused 
service member’s discovery rights.  CAAF, however, expanded on the 
discovery rights guaranteed to accused service members.  Through its 
determination that “[m]ilitary law provides a much more direct and 
generally broader means of discovery by an accused than is normally 
available to him in civilian courts,” CAAF prescribed a liberal discovery 
standard “across the board as an absolute binding mandate.”250  Under this 
standard, government counsel should “generally resolve any questionable 
issue involving discovery in favor of disclosure directly to defense counsel 
or through in camera inspection by the trial judge.”251 
This standard has consequences in trial practice within the military 
justice system.  Because the current military justice process requires and 
mandates government discovery to the defense at various stages—including 
prior to an Article 32 hearing, upon service of charges, and prior to trial—
prosecutors spend much of their time scrambling to adhere to the liberal 
discovery mandates.252  When defense counsel submits a discovery request, 
government counsel must presume that all the requested information is 
material, and therefore provide the information.253  Coupled with the CAAF 
requirement that the government is responsible for providing all 
information within the liberally construed possession of the government, 
military prosecutors become overwhelmed with locating and perfecting 
discovery, adding time and delay to the process.254 
The federal system provides a more efficient model to provide the 
accused with discovery rights.  While the federal system complies with the 
standard discovery responsibilities, to include Brady255 and Jenck’s Act256 
requirements, it does not establish a liberal discovery standard throughout 
the process.  Instead, individual civilian courts “may vary in their 
interpretation of certain discovery rules.”257  Based upon this standard, the 
 
250.  Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 222 (quoting United States v. Reece, 25 M.J. 
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255.  See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that criminal defendants 
possess a constitutional right to receive all exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession). 
256.  18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); Hernandez & Ferguson, supra note 98, at 206 ( “[T]he Jencks 
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military justice system could require the government to provide essential 
discovery material, such as exculpatory evidence and statements made by 
government witnesses when subject to direct examination, while also 
allowing the government to contest the materiality of defense-requested 
discovery that does not fall within those categories.  By doing so, the 
government will be able to proceed with the case and not become muddled 
in defense discovery request quagmires prior to trial. 
3. Trial Reforms 
The due process rights afforded to accused service members during 
trial—the right to an attorney, a jury, a military judge, and the confrontation 
clause, to name a few—generally mirror the rights afforded to accused 
defendants in the federal system.  However, the military justice system 
gives extra rights that resemble veto powers over remote testimony and 
joint trials that civilian defendants do not possess.  By limiting these rights, 
commanders would have additional options in bringing accused service 
members to trial, which, at times, would also quicken the process. 
a. Allow Witness Testimony via VTC 
The expeditionary nature of military service presents a unique 
challenge to the military justice system.  By the time a case proceeds to 
court-martial, trial participants, including witnesses and investigators, may 
have moved on geographically to other assignments, separated from 
military service, or deployed overseas.258  Consequently, in preparation for 
trial, government attorneys must locate these witnesses, secure their travel 
back to the location of the court-martial, and ensure that these witnesses are 
available for the court-martial when scheduled.259  These responsibilities 
come at great cost.  The convening authority must pay for the travel, and 
often, especially when the service member is deployed, this travel impacts 
the military mission.260  Similarly, locating and transporting the witnesses 
and scheduling the trial to minimize mission disturbance adds time to the 
court-martial process.261 
The military justice system that is currently in place does not reflect 
these unique witness availability challenges.  While the military justice 
system currently permits remote testimony in courts-martial, both parties 
must agree to its use.  As such, an accused service member may prohibit the 
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use of remote testimony, which the military judge is obliged to follow.262  
By removing the accused service member's ability to effectively veto the 
use of remote testimony, military prosecutors will be able to rely on 
technology, such as VTC, to secure the testimony of geographically 
separated witnesses, which will save time and resources.263  This 
expediency will come at minimal costs to the accused service members 
because the improvement in VTC technology still allows them to confront 
and cross-examine the witnesses.264 
b. Remove the Preference Against Trying Multiple 
Accused Service Members Together 
The military justice system deviates from the federal system in regards 
to trying multiple accused individuals together when their offenses arise 
from the same misconduct.  In the federal system, the preference is to try 
these individuals together.265  The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded 
federal courts that “[t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint 
trials of defendants who are indicted together.”266  As the Supreme Court 
explained, “‘[j]oint trials ‘play a vital role in the criminal justice system.’  
They promote efficiency and ‘serve the interests of justice by avoiding the 
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’”267 
The military justice system, though, prefers that each accused service 
member be tried individually.  In practice, if the convening authority refers 
multiple accused service members to a combined court-martial, any of the 
service members can move to sever the charges, and the military judge must 
oblige.  The basis of this preference is the issue of forum selection.268  The 
military justice system provides each service member the right to elect their 
trial forum; as such, one service member may elect trial by military judge 
alone, whereas the other service member may request trial by officer and 
enlisted panel members.269 
 
262.  Id. at 104-05; R.C.M. 703. 
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The preference for trying service members separately for shared offenses 
serves to prolong the court-martial process.  Rather than proceeding through 
the pretrial, trial, and post-trial process once, the government must go 
through each process multiple times, adding time to the court-martial 
process.270  By giving commanders the option to try multiple accused at 
once, commanders are able to quickly try these cases and gain efficiencies 
of time and resources that would facilitate good order and discipline within 
their units.271  Again, this efficiency comes at a minimal cost to accused 
service members; the convening authority can still provide each individual 
accused service member with his or her forum rights.  For example: 
[S]hould one accused request trial by judge alone and one 
accused request trial by panel members, the convening 
authority could seat a panel to decide the case of the 
member requesting trial by military panel while the military 
judge decides the case of the service member requesting 
trial by judge alone.272 
4. Post-Trial Reforms—Review the Appellate Process 
The due process right of appellate review is one of those basic due 
process rights that has become so important and ingrained into the military 
justice system that Congress and the military departments cannot 
completely do away with it.  At the same time, however, Congress and the 
military departments must acknowledge and face the difficulties that 
appellate review has on the military justice trinity.  Appellate review is not 
only a lengthy process, but since their creation, the military appellate courts 
have repeatedly created additional due process rights for accused service 
members.273  Should Congress and the military departments elect to limit 
accused service members’ rights to expedite the court-martial process, the 
military appellate courts may undermine their efforts and either restore 
extra-constitutional due process rights or create additional rights. 
Thus, Congress and the military departments should examine 
alternative means of appellate review.  Several possibilities exist.  First, 
Congress and the military departments may expand the types of cases that 
undergo appellate review by the department’s TJAG and limit review by the 
military appeal courts to only the most extreme cases, specifically those 
where the accused service member has been sentenced to life in 
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confinement or to death.274  Second, Congress and the military departments 
could elect to leave the military appellate court’s jurisdiction as is and 
instead limit their authority and standards of review.275  Under this 
approach, accused service members may have their cases reviewed, but the 
military appellate courts may be limited in their ability to establish new due 
process rights. 
B. CREATING A CULTURAL EMPHASIS ON GOOD ORDER AND 
DISCIPLINE 
An appropriate military justice trinity requires more than scaling back 
identifiable excesses in due process.  There remains the omnipresent 
possibility that remaining extra-constitutional due process rights may 
increasingly impede the court-martial process or that Congress, the 
President, the appellate process, or the military departments may introduce 
additional due process rights.  Conversely, the de-escalation of due process 
may go too far, with the military departments and Congress taking away too 
many essential due process rights, resulting in de-legitimized punishment.  
Hence, the military departments must develop a culture built upon the 
military justice trinity that emphasizes the primacy of fair and just good 
order and discipline.  To do so, the MCM’s stated end and purpose of 
military law should be reformed to reflect that good order and discipline is 
the end and purpose of military law, with the military justice system and 
due process supporting and legitimizing good order and discipline.276  With 
the appropriate culture in place, the military justice trinity can preserve a 
proper balance. 
 
274.  The appellate courts review cases under UCMJ art. 66.  Article 66 requires the service 
TJAGs to refer to a court of criminal appeals any case “in which the sentence, as approved, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The past few years have not been kind to military justice.  As Congress 
and the public turn their attention to the perceived failures of the military 
justice system, which are highlighted by the increase in sexual assault and 
misconduct in the deployed environment, the military departments must 
respond and reform.  A failure to do so will not only jeopardize mission 
readiness, as each of these offenses strikes at good order and discipline 
within the military, but also may cause reform to be imposed upon the 
military departments.  To address these issues, the military departments 
must understand what underlies the apparent increase in service member 
misconduct.  Only once the military departments have an explanation can 
they craft an appropriate solution. 
The explanation and solution for this rash of military misconduct lies 
in good order and discipline.  Good order and discipline allows 
commanders to order their service members to kill in combat, to restrain 
from using force in a COIN operation, and to place the interests of their unit 
above their own.  Good order and discipline should prevent service 
members from engaging in sexual assault, murdering civilian non-
combatants in the deployed environment, and conducting themselves in an 
unethical and criminal manner.  Yet, service members continue to engage in 
these crimes despite UCMJ provisions prohibiting such conduct, senior 
leaders regularly speaking out and warning against such conduct, and the 
public and Congress continuing to take notice. 
The reason for this breakdown in good order and discipline is that 
good order and discipline does not operate in a vacuum.  Instead, good 
order and discipline is a prong in the military justice trinity where the 
military justice system, due process, and good order and discipline, working 
in an interconnected manner, combine together to prevent service member 
misconduct.  In an ideal balance, a commander can use the military justice 
system, legitimized and supported by due process, to effectuate good order 
and discipline within his or her unit.  The commander can establish a “state 
of mind that produces proper action and prompt cooperation under all 
circumstances”277 through the threat of punishment via the military justice 
system.  Service members, viewing this process as legitimate due to the 
fairness afforded by due process, will then be deterred from engaging in 
misconduct. 
Commanders, though, cannot currently use this military justice trinity 
to establish a state of mind within their subordinate service members to 
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refrain from engaging in serious misconduct.  Beginning with World War I, 
Congress, the military departments, and the military appellate courts have 
gradually increased the due process rights afforded to accused service 
members, thereby strengthening the due process prong of the military 
justice trinity.  The bolstered due process prong, in turn, impacted the 
military justice system prong.  The court-martial process, once the primary 
tool utilized to preserve good order and discipline, became a time-
consuming and cumbersome option for commanders.  Commanders, 
seeking swift and efficient justice, turned away from the court-martial and 
instead utilized nonjudicial punishment and administrative discharges to 
effectuate good order and discipline. 
The weakened military justice prong subsequently impacted the good 
order and discipline prong.  Commanders must utilize not only positive 
means to achieve good order and discipline within their units, but also 
negative means.  To deter misconduct, commanders require the capacity to 
impose punishment.  It is the military justice system that affords that 
capacity.  In addition, for punishment to deter misconduct, it must be 
credible, severe, swift, and possess collateral consequences.  Without an 
efficient or frequent court-martial tool, commanders no longer have access 
to punishment necessary to deter misconduct.  Therefore, commanders can 
no longer properly effectuate good order and discipline. 
As they search for solutions to the rash of misconduct, the military 
departments must again rely upon good order and discipline.  By doing so, 
the military departments will embed in their service members the 
“intelligent, willing, and positive”278 obedience to the military justice 
system and prohibitions against engaging in such misconduct.  The military 
departments can only do so, however, by balancing the military justice 
trinity.  Good order and discipline requires a fully realized court-martial 
process that can be used with frequency and celerity.  The military 
departments can only restore the court-martial process by reducing the due 
process rights afforded to accused service members.  They must proceed 
carefully, however, as due process legitimizes the military justice system 
and good order and discipline.  Consequently, the military departments 
should direct their focus on reducing the extra-constitutional due process 
rights of accused service members, which unduly lengthen and burden the 
court-martial process, while maintaining the constitutionally afforded due 
process rights of accused service members. 
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